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JOSEPH SMITH, ROMANTICISM, AND
TRAGIC CREATION
Terryl L. Givens
JOSEPH SMITH, AS I THINK HISTORIANS readily recognize, has much to
commend him as a Romantic thinker. Personal freedom was as sa-
cred to him as to the young Schiller, his emphasis on individualism
invites comparison with Byron and Emerson, his view of restora-
tion as inspired syncretism is the religious equivalent of Friedrich
Schlegel’s “progressive universal poetry,” his hostility to dogma
and creeds evokes Blake’s cry, “I must create my own system or be
enslaved by another man’s,” and his celebration of human inno-
cence and human potential transform into theology what Rousseau
and Goethe had merely plumbed through the novel and the
drama. Even his teachings on preexistence were in line with kin-
dred views of Blake, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Shelley, and Goe-
the—all of whose meditations on preexistence can be seen as varia-
tions of what philosopher Charles Taylor considers Romanticism’s
great moral innovation: “We are called to live up to our original-
ity,” because each being is “capable of [radical] self-articulation.”1
But true human authenticity, of course, must be grounded in an
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existence that is uncreated and eternal, which is why Joseph, like
the Romantics, found the necessary basis of human originality and
self-articulation in premortal life. Only thereby could Joseph the
Romantic affirm humans as one of what he called “the three inde-
pendent principles” of the universe.2
But there are strains in Joseph Smith that seem utterly incom-
patible with the essence of Romanticism. Joseph was—and there
seems no way around this—an uncompromising legalist. Personally, I
have found this the most vexing and incongruous dimension to Jo-
seph the man, the prophet, and the theologian. A legalistic vocabu-
lary dominated his religious thought: Authority, priesthood, laws,
and ordinances were everything. “There is no salvation,” he declared,
“without a legal administrator.” That title he applied to Zachariah,
John, and even Jesus Christ;3 the prophet is whoever holds “keys,”
and the exact “order and ordinances of the Kingdom” were non-nego-
tiable, set in stone “by the Priesthood in the council of heaven before
the world was.”4 In Oliver Cowdery’s 1834 version of Mormonism’s
articles of faith, he wrote: “We believe that God is the same in all ages;
and that it requires the same holiness, purity, and religion, to save a
man now, as it did anciently.”5 In Joseph’s final version, that belief
drops out, to be replaced by “a man must be called of God . . . by the
laying on hands, by those who are in authority, to . . .administer in the
ordinances” of the gospel.6
Months before Joseph died, his reliance on such legal power cli-
maxed in a shocking invocation of form and authority over either
God’s grace or personal virtue: “If you have power to seal on earth &
in heaven then we should be Crafty, the first thing you do go & seal on
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earth your sons & daughters unto yourself, & yourself unto your fa-
thers in eternal glory, & go ahead and not go back, but use a little
Craftiness & seal all you can. . . . I will walk through the gate of heaven
and Claim what I seal & those that follow me and my council.”7 He
sounds here as if he is prepared to out-lawyer St. Peter himself.
This is the seeming inconsistency at the heart of Joseph Smith
that I want to examine today. Is there a way to make sense of these
fiercely opposed tendencies in Joseph’s gospel vision? I am hoping
that a broad vision of his era might help. I propose to set the stage for
this conversation about Joseph Smith with what I consider the two
most momentous intellectual innovations of the eighteenth century,
one by William Herschel and one by Edmund Burke. And I want to
position Joseph as a prophet caught up in, and yet resisting, certain
developments called Romanticism in his contemporary cultural mi-
lieu. In spite of my focus on intellectual contexts, I am not going to
make any claims about derivation, or inf luence, for two reasons. First,
in Joseph’s own conception of prophetic vocation, he emphatically re-
sists facile notions of originality or intellectual theft. His words make
clear, I believe, that he considered restoration a process of inspired
eclecticism and assimilation. And second, as Lord Acton said, “Few
discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree
of an idea.”8 I set the stage, rather, that we may have a fuller apprecia-
tion of how Joseph’s religious conceptions represented a particularly
prescient engagement with the shifting currents of his day.
In 1789, as revolutionaries in France were reshaping the politi-
cal order, the leading astronomer of the age, William Herschel, was
shifting the cosmic paradigm. His paper on “The Construction of the
Heavens,” published by the Royal Society in 1785, effected a change
in the Western world’s cosmic vision more dramatic than Coperni-
cus’s replacement of an earth-centered system by a heliocentric one.
For generations of thinkers, God’s supreme perfections had seemed
to suggest that the universe He created was likewise f lawless and com-
plete when He laid down His celestial instruments. When He pro-
nounced His labors good and rested from His efforts, the perfectly or-
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dered cosmos had naught to do but hum along in sublime harmony
until the end of time.
At first, Herschel’s astronomical observations through his tele-
scopes of unprecedented power and precision only confirmed the in-
finitude of God’s domain, revealing star systems beyond star systems
in unending procession. But Herschel quickly perceived that he was
observing a universe in a process of continual disruption, upheaval,
and transformation on a colossal scale. He described “extensive com-
binations,” stars in process of “condensation,” others in retreat or in
collision. “When, at the same time that a cluster of stars is forming in
one part of space, there may be another collecting in a different, but
perhaps no far distant quarter, which may occasion a mutual ap-
proach towards their common center of gravity. . . . As a natural con-
sequence of the former cases, there will be formed great cavities or
vacancies by the retreat of the stars towards the various centers which
attract them.” The whole was a scene of such violent contestation that
he admitted surprise that the entirety did not “tend to a general de-
struction, by the shock of one star’s falling upon another.”9 Indeed, as
one writer has summarized the import of Herschel’s shocking discov-
ery, he “completely overturned any residual idea of a stable, overarch-
ing, temple-like universe, created once and for all by the great Celes-
tial Architect” and replaced it with a dynamic cosmos of waxing and
waning worlds, “f luid movements and changes.”10
Becoming versus Being, Process versus Perfection, Creation,
Time, and Eternity—on diverse interpretations of such principles
hang theologies, cosmologies, and philosophical systems. Five years
after Herschel’s essay, William Blake gave the new age its mantra
when he wrote that “without contraries is no progression.”11 The
long nineteenth century would see Blake’s assertion elaborated
across the entire span of intellectual achievement. The Great Chain of
Being, unchallenged paradigm of a static, orderly, and harmonious
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universe, was buried beneath the emergent model of chaos, f lux, rad-
ical transformation, and conf lict. Thomas Malthus wrote in 1798 that
human populations and natural resources were in perpetual colli-
sion, resulting in a planetary legacy of famine, disease, and calamity.
G. W. Hegel made the violent confrontation of a thesis with its antith-
esis the interpretive key to human history. Marx made matter rather
than spirit the foundational principle, and transformed Hegel’s dia-
lectic into the most inf luential political theory of succeeding genera-
tions. Darwin rewrote the human understanding of the natural world
and God’s place in it by accounting for the diversity and splendor of
all creation in terms of unremitting competition within and between
species. If there was one prevailing sense in which Joseph Smith was a
child of his age, it was in the avidity with which he translated this Ro-
mantic paradigm of agon, or struggle, into theological terms. The
result pervaded his cosmology, his human anthropology, and even his
doctrine of Deity.
To characterize creation as an ongoing project is quintessen-
tially Romantic. Process was for all of them more important than
product. Joseph combined the dynamism of Herschel’s cosmos with
the catastrophism of George Cuvier, when he announced: “This
Earth has been organized out of portions of other Globes that [have]
been Disorganized,” he said. “Organized and formed out of other
planets which were broke[n] up and remodeled and made into the
one on which we live.” He added, “This earth was not the first of
God’s work,” and clearly it would not be the last.12 As to humans, Jo-
seph makes them co-participants with Deity itself in the ongoing pro-
ject of world creation. Filtered through Pratt’s rhetoric, Joseph’s vi-
sion seems pure Herschel here as well: “Thus perfected, the whole
family will . . . continue to organize, people, redeem, and perfect
other systems which are now in the womb of chaos.”13 And even Deity
itself becomes at Joseph’s hands the most moved, rather than the un-
moved, mover—not just in His infinite empathy, not just in His endow-
ment with body, parts, and passions, but in His emergence out of a
murky past, in a continuing process, and who will yet continue to ad-
vance from glory to glory. Herschel’s “Construction of the Heavens”
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was, in other words, an appropriate prelude, and a resonant counter-
part, to the cosmic stories Joseph would unfold.
Joseph was inclined to be off and running with the essence of
Romantic religion. There seemed to be a clear impulse on his part to
embrace the full implications of a universe of freedom, progress, and
limitlessness: no creeds to constrain, no arbitrary rules or rituals to
hinder. It was an impulse that animated myriads of his contemporar-
ies. Augustine’s position, embraced for a thousand years and more,
was no longer tenable. Some ask, he had written, “if it was Adam and
Eve who sinned, what did we poor wretches do? . . . My response is
brief: let them be silent and stop murmuring.”14 But by the nine-
teenth century, Calvinism collapsed under the onus of a fire-breath-
ing God. Edward Beecher, son of Lyman and brother to Henry Ward,
was himself part of the new wave that rebelled against the traditions
of the fathers: “The inherited religious teachings about human nature
and human culpability,” he wrote, made of our creator a “highly un-
just and dishonorable . . . God,” and no sophistry or good intent could
get around that intractable affront to reason and sensibility.15
For Joseph, too, none of the old explanations or authoritarian
strictures seemed to apply. “Trying a man for his faith” smacked of
sectarianism. “It felt so good not to be trammeled,” he wrote. Damn-
ing unbaptized children, he said, was “not consistant with the charac-
ter of God.”16 This true character, he was sure, was not the character
of the creedal God.
In one sermon, Joseph went so far as to say that “all who would
follow the precepts of the Bible, whether Mormon or not, would as-
suredly be saved.”17 He added later that even those without knowl-
edge of or obedience to the Bible would be enfolded in the arms of
mercy: “God hath made a provision that every spirit can be ferretted
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out in that world that has not sinned the unpardonable sin.”18 His vi-
sion was f lexible, generous, tolerant, and liberal—in perfect harmony
with the world of f lux and expansiveness Herschel had discovered
and that the Romantics so relished.
But let us consider another founding document of Romanti-
cism, one that at first seems in harmony with Herschel’s, but whose
eventual repercussions might explain a contrary tendency that was
also developing in Joseph’s thought. This second pivotal event oc-
curred slightly earlier in 1757, when Edmund Burke produced an in-
teresting little essay titled, “A Philosophical Inquiry into Our Ideas
Concerning the Sublime and the Beautiful.” The sublime had been a
characteristic in classical conceptions of rhetoric dating back to Lon-
ginus and even earlier, but it had largely fallen into disuse in the Eng-
lish-speaking world. Burke’s timing was superb. He reinvigorated the
concept and endowed it with a plethora of meanings and associations
that were perfectly calculated to appeal to sensibilities that were al-
ready tiring of the sterility and the intellectualism of contemporary
philosophers and men of science. The excesses of those secular En-
lightenment philosophes came to a head in 1793, when Notre Dame Ca-
thedral was repurposed as a Temple of Reason. The problem, as Wil-
liam James insightfully remarked a century later, was that, for some
people, “richness is the supreme imaginative requirement,” express-
ing an “inner need” for something to which we can attach “adjectives
of mystery and splendor.”19 James put his finger precisely on an irre-
pressible human appetite for the sublime, the mysterious. And if you
do away with the mysterium tremendum of the creeds, you had better be
prepared to put something in its place.
A thoroughgoing rationalist like Samuel Johnson could sniff
that “all wonder is the effect of novelty upon ignorance,”20 but Burke
knew better. His treatise was written in reaction to the stolid dourness
of Johnsonians and against the rationalism of Descartes and the intel-
lectual rigor of Locke. In his essay on the sublime, Burke explicitly
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gloried in obfuscation, darkness, and stupefying wonder. “Hardly any
thing can strike the mind with its greatness,” he wrote, “which does
not make some sort of approach towards infinity; which nothing can
do whilst we are able to perceive its bounds; but to see an object dis-
tinctly, and to perceive its bounds, is one and the same thing. A clear
idea is therefore another name for a little idea.” In fact, he continued
rapturously, “It is our ignorance of things that causes all our admira-
tion and chief ly excites our passions.” Here we enter a world in which
the earlier John Milton is the exemplar because, in Milton’s work,
Burke enthuses, “all is dark, uncertain, confused, terrible and sublime
to the last degree.”21
The book inspired a seismic shift in aesthetic sensibility. Almost
the entirety of Romantic discourse needs to be seen as the thorough-
going elaboration of Burke’s phenomenal achievement. He made it
possible to excise God from his commanding presence in educated
discourse and seamlessly insinuate, in his stead, mystery, wonder, sub-
limity. René Chateaubriand was the most popular exploiter of the
new sensibility, but dozens could be cited. He wrote rapturously in
1800 that “no circumstance of life is pleasing, beautiful, or grand, ex-
cept mysterious things. The most wonderful sentiments are those
which produce impressions difficult to be explained.” Dreamily he
characterized “Mystery” as “of a nature so divine,” and he glorified
what he called “holy ignorance.”22 Chateaubriand epitomized per-
fectly the strategy by which an entire generation of poets and intellec-
tuals made their peace with the departure of the sacred from their
world. They simply reconstituted it in new garb. The catastrophe that
this shift invited, and the reverberations of which are still all about us,
was the diminishment of the religious and the veneration in its stead
of the “spiritual.” Religion has been cheapened ever since.
Romanticism was not long in imploding under the weight of its
obsession with feeling over intellect, emotion over substance, and
selfhood over community. Schiller’s experiments in freedom col-
lapse into savage chaos, Byronic individualism becomes Napoleonic
despotism, and radical subjectivism becomes Nietzschean amorality.
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Not all Romantics, of course, became secularists or New Agers.
One might trace, unevenly perhaps, some of the consequences of this
new sensibility as it plays out within Christianity. Religion is increas-
ingly personalized and interiorized. The privatized spirituality of the
pietists becomes the unmediated and unregulated religiosity of Meth-
odism, the Christian version of Romanticism if there ever was one. In
another strain, reaction against the God who holds us like spiders over
a f lame, morphs into the universalism whereby the entire human fam-
ily is saved, before culminating in the dismissal of hell and Christ both.
An epitome of the contemporary afterclap of Romantic thought in the
religious sphere is emblazoned on the marquee of a country church I
passed in rural Massachusetts inviting passersby to join the worship:
“Soft pews, and no hell.” And the same new sensibility emerges in the
abiding popularity of a little verse by William Blake, a summation of
the Romantic sensibility that has served as a virtual mantra for genera-
tions of those who confuse discipleship with self-absorption:
To see the world in a grain of sand,
and heaven in a wildf lower
hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
and eternity in an hour.
Ironically, it took a Marxist critic, Terry Eagleton, to point out in
reference to this verse, that the Gospel of Matthew teaches: “Eternity
lies not in a grain of sand but in a glass of water. The cosmos revolves
on comforting the sick. When you act in this way, you are sharing in
the love which built the stars. To live in this way is not just to have life,
but to have it in abundance.”23
How aware and how concerned was Joseph Smith with this
other side of Romantic thought and its repercussions? How self-aware
was he of the dangers of a cheapened religiosity? And might we un-
derstand his legalism as a gesture in the direction of putting the
brakes on the excesses which Burke’s treatise portends? In the case of
universalism in particular, he was keenly aware of the stakes and dan-
gers.24 I might argue that Joseph rooted his theology in the opposing
grounds of Romantic liberalism on the one hand, with its untram-
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meled freedom, and legalistic frameworks with their laws and ordi-
nances on the other, to avoid the excesses of both. These imperatives
could go by many names: I have been referring to them as Romanti-
cism and legalism; but let us think of them instead as love and law.
But another way to resolve the conundrum might be to see Jo-
seph’s emphasis on law as a guarantee of freedom, not its antithesis.
But it’s a tragic guarantee. To look more closely at a particular mo-
ment law seems to oppose but actually guarantees generosity of heart,
let us look at the problem of universal salvation. The universalist
agenda began with the premise that God, being full of love, would
never have created the human race, “unless he intended to make
them finally happy.”25 Joseph pushed the imperative toward univer-
sal salvation further than any of his contemporaries, because his God
was more moved by compassion than any contemporary God. “The
idea that God cannot suffer, [was] accepted virtually as axiomatic in
Christian theology from the early Greek Fathers until the nineteenth-
century.”26 Another concurs that it was only “toward the end of the
nineteenth century [that] a sea of change began to occur within Chris-
tian theology such that at present many, if not most, Christian theolo-
gians hold as axiomatic that God . . . does undergo emotional changes
of states, and so can suffer.”27 Joseph, of course, pronounced not only
that God felt love, but that He wept real tears, as the most moved, not
unmoved, mover.
But in loving man enough to give him his agency, God set up the
conditions for a tragic universe. Here is how the dilemma unfolds.
Man, in his freedom, chooses sin. The freedom to sin collides with
God’s desire to save. The two leading figures of early Universalism re-
solved the problem by simply declaring that any hell or torment would
be temporary. That still left the problem of the biblical language of
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eternity and everlastingness. To get around this problem, and using
language that Joseph would later echo, John Murray argues that “it is
one thing to be punished with everlasting destruction, and another to
be everlastingly punished with destruction.” The pain of a candle
f lame, he clarified, is brief, but the pain is still “everlasting fire.”28
Eventually, Murray and Chauncy both conceded, all humans would
have to come to Christ to be saved. “’Tis true,” Chauncy conceded,
God “will not, in this state, prevail upon all willingly to bow down before
him as their Lord. . . . May he not, . . . use means with sinners in the next
state, in order to make them good subjects in the moral kingdom of God
. . .?”29 Murray concurred that the great work of salvation would have
to take place in the next realm. Opponents protested: “Now is the ac-
cepted time, now is the day of salvation; you may not have another.”30
Murray replied that, indeed, “now” will always be “the accepted time,”
and there will always be a “now.”31 Notice that, in both cases, they fail to
resolve the problem of how choice will be reconciled with reward. They
just defer the problem, in order to blithely assert a universal salvation.
Joseph comes close to their position, of course. So close, that
some members apostatized over Section 76, received in early 1832,
and Brigham Young’s brother Joseph protested initially that it seem-
ed everybody would be saved. Almost everybody. The explanation of
why everybody could not be saved came almost a year later, with Sec-
tion 88, which ref lected Joseph’s most profound statement on law,
freedom, and the cost of moral agency: “That which breaketh a law,
and abideth not by law, but seeketh to become a law unto itself, and
willeth to abide in sin, and altogether abideth in sin, cannot be sancti-
fied by law, neither by mercy, justice, nor judgment. Therefore, they
must remain filthy still” (D&C 88:35).
Hell does not exist because of some inf lexible ultimatum de-
creed by an impersonal Justice. Reward and punishment are entailed
not simply because that is the “fair” or “just” thing for God to do. For
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God is also merciful, and if humans can remit a penalty out of com-
passion or mercy, why cannot God? Because, as Alma explains, such
apparent generosity would undermine the essence of that agency on
which moral freedom depends. Consequences are chosen at the time
actions are freely committed. To choose to indulge a desire is to
choose its fruit—bitter or sweet—assuming, as Lehi did, that “men are
instructed sufficiently” to understand what they are choosing (2 Ne.
2:5). So following the exercise of such agency, “the one [must be]
raised to happiness according to his desires of happiness, or good ac-
cording to his desires of good; and the other to evil according to his
desires of evil” (Alma 41:5). It is a truth that harks back to Dante’s
grim vision of hell, in which God is not present as Judge or dispenser
of punishments, because choices are allowed, inexorably, to bear
their own fruit. In Alma’s Inferno as well, future states are chosen, not
assigned: “For behold,” says Alma, “they are their own judges” (Alma
41:7).
Law, in this vision, is the glue that binds actions to their conse-
quences, and thus guarantees the validity of agency. It is not about jus-
tice. It is about meaningful freedom. A universal clemency would not
compromise justice. It would void agency. To bestow universal salva-
tion, would be to impose on a moral agent a consequence he did not
will, that is, did not choose, to receive. Joseph understood that Satan’s
tool against agency was not targeted coercion, but unfiltered acquies-
cence. (We have largely lost this understanding Joseph had of the War
in Heaven, in which the adversary’s plan was to remit consequences
and thereby void agency, not obliterate it through force).
The painful consequences of law are where tragic creation comes
in. C. S. Lewis, with painfully overcautious moral probing, offered this
meditation on Christian orthodoxy: “I am not sure that the great can-
yon of anguish which lies across our lives is solely due to some pre-his-
toric catastrophe. Something tragic may . . . be inherent in the very act
of creation.” For this reason, he suggested, “Besides being the Great
Creator, . . . perhaps [he is] the Tragic Creator too.”32
God is the tragic creator in the sense that Hegel meant, when he
said we inhabit a tragic universe, because it is characterized by irrec-
oncilable collisions between competing values, all of which have the
right to claim an absolute validity. The tragedy of human existence in
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particular, is the tragedy of absolute freedom versus perfect love.
Love is manifest in the granting of freedom. And law is but the
guarantee of freedom.
The tragic cost of this agency is comprehended in all the misery
that sin and alienation entail. It is only assured everlastingly in the
Sons of Perdition, and Joseph’s conception of agency and law suggest
that their punishment has little to do with the gravity of their sin, per
se, because the description of their sin makes clear that Christ’s atone-
ment can extend only to those whose choices are made with an imper-
fect or compromised will. Which means virtually all of humankind.
Our choices, in other words, are usually made with imperfect clarity
and f lawed understanding. Only the unpardonable sin, against per-
fect light, committed with untainted deliberation, in full and utter
knowledge of its meaning and repercussions, is the sin against the
Holy Ghost. It cannot be forgiven not because it is so grievous or offen-
sive, but because it is the only sin a human can make with no mitigat-
ing circumstances. All other sins are performed “through a glass
darkly” (1 Cor. 13:12), as it were, without a perfect understanding, on
an uneven playing field, where to greater or lesser degree the weak-
ness of the f lesh, of intellect, or of judgment intrudes. In all such
cases, regret and reconsideration are conceivable. Only the choice of
evil made in the most absolute and perfect light of understanding ad-
mits no imaginable basis for reconsideration or regret—which are, of
course, at the root of the very meaning of repentance.
And so the law, for Joseph Smith, was not the opponent of free-
dom, but its ally. What at times could appear legalism might, in a
broader context be seen as his resistance to the well-intentioned but
disastrous illusion of an ungrounded human autonomy. The ordi-
nances provided an unchanging framework giving continuity to our
relationship to the divine. God not only revealed all the ordinances of
salvation to Adam, Joseph taught, but He intended them “to be the
same forever, and set Adam to watch over them [and] to reveal them
from heaven to man or to send Angels to reveal them” in the event of
their loss.33 Their unvarying employment was the token of a covenant
that binds us to premortal conventions we participated in creating:
They constitute “the most perfect order and harmony—and their lim-
its and bounds were fixed irrevocably and voluntarily subscribed
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to.”34 This is why, in Joseph’s words, we “have got to be subject to cer-
tain rules & principles” established “before the world was.”35 These
rules and principles, of course, are often ritually introduced and af-
firmed, and that usually happens in the context of covenant making.
The ritualistic dimension of this covenant making occurs in the
school of the prophets, baptism, the sacrament, and the temple. The
ritualistic saturation, the logical culmination of Joseph’s legalistic
bent, oriented around these preordained “rules and principles,” al-
lows disciples to enact in dramatic fashion very specific choices tied
to very particular consequences. I want to emphasize this point, be-
cause I think it gives an important context for understanding Joseph’s
constant linking of ritual to covenants. Ritual is in this sense not
merely symbolic activity, but mimetic performance. The bodily di-
mension to ritual gives the action a particular efficacy. Insofar as it
concretizes deliberate choice, it transforms inchoate desire into
somatic form. Covenant is the verbal, and ritual the performative,
recognition of law’s benevolent dominion.
As a student of literature, I ask your indulgence for ending with
a literary coda. If Joseph had one contemporary who shared his con-
cerns about the dangers of unfettered freedom and what I have called
law’s benevolent dominion, it was William Wordsworth, who toured
revolutionary France and came to recoil in horror from what he saw.
The revolutionary dream had turned nightmare, and he wrote a great
“Ode to Duty” in which he recognized the illusory bliss of what he
called “unchartered freedom,” the “weary strife” it engendered, and
the law as the “Godhead’s most benignant grace.”36 But it was in a
simpler sonnet that he captured the essential paradox of Romantic-
ism and legalism, of love and law.
“Nuns Fret Not,” he called the sonnet. The poet here finds an
apt allegory in the seeming constraints that poetic rules and forms
impose on the impulse toward free expression. His words about po-
etic discipline seem an appropriate summation of Joseph’s apparent
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belief that the fullest expression of agency can only unfold within the
context of a certain religious rigor.
In part, it reads:
Nuns fret not at their convent’s narrow room;
And hermits are contented with their cells;
And students with their pensive citadels;
. . . In truth the prison, unto which we doom
Ourselves, no prison is.37
Perhaps, Wordsworth concludes, “some Souls . . . who have felt
the weight of too much liberty, should find brief solace there, as I have
found.”
For Joseph Smith’s followers, of course, the solace is eternal.
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